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ABSTRACT
Bitcoin is a popular alternative to fiat money, widely used for
its perceived anonymity properties. However, recent attacks
on Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer (P2P) network demonstrated that
its gossip-based flooding protocols, which are used to ensure
global network consistency, may enable user deanonymization—
the linkage of a user’s IP address with her pseudonym in
the Bitcoin network. In 2015, the Bitcoin community re-
sponded to these attacks by changing the network’s flood-
ing mechanism to a different protocol, known as diffusion.
However, no systematic justification was provided for the
change, and it is unclear if diffusion actually improves the
system’s anonymity. In this paper, we model the Bitcoin
networking stack and analyze its anonymity properties, both
pre- and post-2015. In doing so, we consider new adversar-
ial models and spreading mechanisms that have not been
previously studied in the source-finding literature. We the-
oretically prove that Bitcoin’s networking protocols (both
pre- and post-2015) offer poor anonymity properties on net-
works with a regular-tree topology. We validate this claim
in simulation on a 2015 snapshot of the real Bitcoin P2P
network topology.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
G.2.2 [Graph Theory]: Network problems, Graph algo-
rithms
Keywords
Cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
The Bitcoin cryptocurrency has seen widespread adop-
tion, due in part to its reputation as a privacy-preserving fi-
nancial system [21, 26]. In practice, though, Bitcoin exhibits
a number of serious privacy vulnerabilities [4, 23, 31, 32, 28].
Most of these vulnerabilities arise because of two key prop-
erties: (1) Bitcoin associates each user with a pseudonym,
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and (2) pseudonyms can be linked to financial transactions
by way of a public transaction ledger, called the blockchain
[27]. This means that if an attacker is able to associate a
pseudonym with its human user, the attacker may learn the
user’s entire transaction history. Such leakage represents a
massive privacy violation, and would be deemed unaccept-
able in traditional banking systems.
In practice, there are several ways to link a user to her Bit-
coin pseudonym. The most commonly-studied methods an-
alyze transaction patterns in the public blockchain, and link
those patterns using side information [28, 31]. In this paper,
we are interested in a lower-layer vulnerability: the network-
ing stack. Like most cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin nodes com-
municate over a P2P network [27]. The anonymity implica-
tions of this P2P network have been largely ignored until re-
cently, when researchers demonstrated empirical deanonymiza-
tion attacks that exploit the P2P network’s management
protocols [8, 19]. These findings are particularly trouble-
some because the Bitcoin P2P stack is used in a number
of other cryptocurrencies (or altcoins), some of which are
designed with provable anonymity guarantees in mind [3,
33]. Hence vulnerabilities in the Bitcoin P2P network may
extend to a host of other cryptocurrencies as well.
We are interested in one key aspect of the Bitcoin P2P
network: the dissemination of transactions. Whenever a
user (Alice) generates a transaction (i.e., she sends bitcoins
to another user, Bob), she first creates a “transaction mes-
sage” that contains her pseudonym, Bob’s pseudonym, and
the transaction amount. Alice subsequently broadcasts this
transaction message over the P2P network, which enables
other users to validate her transaction and incorporate it
into the global blockchain.
The broadcast of transactions is critical to maintaining
blockchain consistency. Broadcasting proceeds by flooding
transactions along links in the P2P network. The actual
flooding protocol has been the subject of some discussion,
and is central to our paper. In particular, we are inter-
ested in theoretically quantifying the anonymity properties
of existing flooding protocols used by the Bitcoin networking
stack.
Anonymity in the Bitcoin P2P network. Transaction
broadcasting opens a new avenue for deanonymization at-
tacks. If an attacker can infer the IP address that initiated a
transaction broadcast, then the attacker can also link the IP
address to the associated user’s Bitcoin pseudonym. Since
IP addresses can sometimes be linked to human identities
(e.g., with the help of an ISP), this deanonymization vector
is a powerful one.
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In recent years, security researchers demonstrated pre-
cisely such deanonymization attacks, which exploit Bitcoin’s
transaction-flooding protocols. These attacks rely on a “su-
pernode” that connects to active Bitcoin nodes and listens
to the transaction traffic relayed by honest nodes [19, 8, 9].
Using this technique, researchers were able to link Bitcoin
users’ pseudonyms to their IP addresses with an accuracy of
up to 30% [8].
In 2015, the Bitcoin community responded to these at-
tacks by changing its flooding protocols from a gossip-style
protocol known as trickle spreading to a diffusion spreading
protocol that spreads content with independent exponential
delays [1]. We define these protocols precisely in Section
2. However, no systematic motivation was provided for this
shift. Indeed, it is unclear whether the change actually de-
fends against the deanonymization attacks in [8, 19].
1.1 Problem and Contributions
Our goal is to analyze the anonymity properties of the Bit-
coin P2P network. The main point of our paper is to show
that the Bitcoin network has poor anonymity properties,
and the community’s shift from trickle spreading (pre-2015)
to diffusion spreading (post-2015) did not help the situation.
The optimal (maximum-likelihood) source-identification al-
gorithms change between protocols; identifying such algo-
rithms and quantifying their performance is the primary
focus of this work. We find that despite having different
maximum-likelihood estimators, trickle and diffusion exhibit
roughly the same, poor anonymity properties. Our specific
contributions are threefold:
(1) Modeling. We model the Bitcoin P2P network and an
‘eavesdropper adversary’, whose capabilities reflect recent
practical attacks in [8, 19]. This task is complicated by the
fact that most Bitcoin network protocols are not explicitly
documented. Modeling the system therefore requires parsing
a combination of documentation, papers, and code. Several
of the resulting models are new to the rumor source analysis
literature.
(2) Analysis of Trickle (Pre-2015). We analyze the
probability of deanonymization by an eavesdropper adver-
sary under trickle propagation, which was used until 2015.
Our analysis is conducted over a regular tree-structured net-
work. Although the Bitcoin network topology is not a reg-
ular tree, we will see in Section 2 that regular trees are
a reasonable first-order model. We consider suboptimal,
graph-independent estimators (e.g., the first-timestamp es-
timator), as well as maximum-likelihood estimators; both
are defined precisely in Section 2. Our analysis suggests
that although the first-timestamp estimator performs poorly
on high-degree trees, maximum-likelihood estimators can
achieve high probabilities of detection for trees of any de-
gree d (Table 1).
(3) Analysis of Diffusion (Post-2015). We conduct a
similar analysis of diffusion spreading, which was adopted
in 2015 as a fix for the anonymity weaknesses observed un-
der trickle propagation [8, 19]. Table 1 summarizes a subset
of our results, which characterize the probability of detec-
tion asymptotically in tree degree d. We wish to highlight
the fact that trickle and diffusion exhibit similar anonymity
behavior. We revisit this table more carefully in Section 5,
where we also empirically validate our findings on a snapshot
of the real Bitcoin network from 2015.
Table 1: Summary of probability of detection results on reg-
ular trees. Asymptotics are in the tree degree d. Notice that
results for trickle and diffusion are similar.
Trickle
(pre-2015)
Diffusion
(post-2015)
First-
Timestamp
log(d)
d log(2)
+ o
(
log d
d
)
(Eq. 5)
log(d−1)
(d−2)
(Thm. 4.1)
Maximum-
Likelihood
Θ(1) (Thm. 3.3) Θ(1) (Thm 4.2)
Paper Structure. We begin by modeling Bitcoin’s P2P
networking stack and the adversaries of interest in Section
2. We then analyze the performance of trickle propagation
in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze the performance of
diffusion. We compare these results side-by-side in Section
5, which also includes empirical trials on a snapshot of the
real Bitcoin network. We discuss the relation between our
results and prior work in Section 6. Section 7 concludes
by discussing the practical implications of these results and
preliminary ideas on how to solve the problem.
2. MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
To characterize the anonymity of Bitcoin’s P2P network,
we need to model three key aspects of the system: the net-
work topology, the spreading protocol, and the adversary’s
capabilities.
2.1 Network Model
The Bitcoin P2P network contains two classes of nodes:
servers and clients. Clients are nodes that do not accept in-
coming TCP connections (e.g., nodes behind NAT), whereas
servers do accept incoming connections. Clients and servers
have different networking protocols and anonymity concerns.
For instance, clients do not relay transactions. We focus in
this work on servers.
We model the P2P network of servers as a graph G(V,E),
where V is the set of all server nodes and E is the set
of edges, or connections, between them. In practice, each
server node is represented by a (IP address, port) tuple.
Currently, there are about 5,000 active Bitcoin servers, and
this number generally remains stable over the timescale of a
single transaction broadcast [10]. Each server is allowed to
establish up to eight outgoing connections to active Bitcoin
nodes and maintain up to 125 total active connections [8,
2]. For a connection between Alice and Bob, an outgoing
connection (from Alice’s perspective) is one that is initiated
by Alice, whereas an incoming connection is one initiated
by Bob. However, these TCP connections are bidirectional
once established. Most of a server’s incoming connections
are from Bitcoin clients, so they are irrelevant to our analy-
sis. However, we will see momentarily that adversaries can
use the asymmetry between incoming and outgoing connec-
tions to monitor the network for deanonymization attacks.
The resulting sparse random graph between servers can be
modeled approximately as a 16-regular graph; in practice,
the average degree is closer to 8 due to nonhomogeneities
across nodes [24]. Critically, the graph is locally tree-like and
(approximately) regular. For this reason, regular trees are
a natural class of graphs to study. In our theoretical analysis,
we model G as a d-regular tree. We validate this choice
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by running simulations on a snapshot of the true Bitcoin
network [24] (Section 5).
2.2 Spreading Protocols
Recall that every time a transaction (or a block) is com-
pleted, it is broadcast over the network. In this work, we an-
alyze the spread of a single message originating from source
node v∗ ∈ V . Without loss of generality, we will label v∗ as
node ‘0’ whenever we are iterating over nodes.
The broadcasting protocol for messages has been under
discussion in the Bitcoin community recently. Until 2015,
the Bitcoin network used a gossip-like trickle broadcasting
protocol. However, in the wake of various anonymity attacks
[8, 9, 19], the reference Bitcoin implementation changed its
networking stack to use a different broadcasting protocol
known as diffusion [1]. In this paper, we evaluate both pro-
tocols and compare their performance.
Trickle spreading is a gossip-based flooding protocol.
Each message source or relay randomly orders its neighbors
who have not yet seen the message; we call these uninfected
neighbors. It then transmits the message to its neighbors
according to the ordering, with a constant delay of 200 ms
between transmissions [8]. We model this spreading proto-
col by assuming a discrete-time system; each source or relay
randomly orders its uninfected neighbors and transmits the
message to one neighbor per subsequent time step. We as-
sume a node begins relaying a message in the first timestep
after it receives the message.
In diffusion spreading, each source or relay node trans-
mits the message to each of its uninfected neighbors with
an independent, exponential delay of rate λ. We assume a
continuous-time system, in which a node starts the expo-
nential clocks as soon as it receives (or creates) a message.
For both protocols, we let Xv denote the timestamp at
which honest node v ∈ V receives a given message. Note
that server nodes cannot be infected more than once. We
assume the message originates at time t = 0, so Xv∗ =
X0 = 0. Moreover, we let Gt(Vt, Et) denote the infected
subgraph of G at time t, or the subgraph of nodes who have
received the message (but not necessarily reported it to the
adversary) by time t.
2.3 Adversarial Model
We consider an adversary whose goal is to link a message
with the (IP address, port) that originated it. In our setup,
this translates to identifying the source node v∗ ∈ V .
To this end, we introduce an eavesdropper adversary,
whose capabilities are modeled on the practical deanonymiza-
tion attacks in [8, 19]. These attacks are cheap, scalable, and
simple, so they represent realistic threats to the network. We
begin by describing the attacks at a practical level, and then
extract models for the actual analysis.
The attacks in [8, 19] use a supernode that connects to
most of the servers in the Bitcoin network. The supernode
can make multiple connections to each honest server, with
each connection coming from a different (IP address, port).
Hence, the honest server does not realize that the supern-
ode’s connections are all from the same entity. The supern-
ode can compromise arbitrarily many of a server’s unused
connections, up to the hard limit of 125 total connections.
We model this setup by assuming that the eavesdropper ad-
versary makes a fixed number θ of connections to each server,
where θ ≥ 1. We do not include these adversarial connec-
𝑣 ∗
Eavesdropper 𝑑 = 2𝜃 = 3
Figure 1: The eavesdropper adversary establishes θ links
(shown in red) to each server. Honest servers are connected
in a d-regular tree topology (edges shown in black).
tions in the original server graph G, so G remains a d-regular
graph. This setup is illustrated in Figure 1.
Once the supernode in [8, 19] is established, it simply lis-
tens to all relayed messages on the network, without relaying
or transmitting any content—hence the name ‘eavesdropper
adversary.’ Over time, due to peer address propagation pro-
tocols (which were not discussed here), the adversary learns
the network structure between servers. Therefore, we as-
sume that G(V,E) is known to the eavesdropper adversary.
The supernode in [8, 19] also observes the timestamps at
which messages are relayed from each honest server. Since
the adversary maintains multiple active connections to each
server, it receives the message multiple times from each
server. For ease of analysis, we assume that the eavesdropper
adversary only stores the first such timestamp. We also as-
sume that the adversary observes all timestamps relative to
time t = 0, i.e., it knows when the message started spread-
ing. Given this, we let τv denote the time at which the
adversary first observes the message from node v ∈ V . We
let τ denote the set of all observed timestamps.
Relation to existing adversarial models. We wish to
briefly highlight the difference between the eavesdropper ad-
versary and two commonly-studied adversarial models. The
snapshot adversary is the most common adversary in this
space [36, 35, 37, 14, 20]. A snapshot adversary observes the
set of infected nodes at a single time T ; in our notation, the
adversary learns the set {v ∈ V : Xv ≤ T} (no timestamps),
along with graph G. The eavesdropper adversary differs in
that it eventually observes a noisy timestamp τv for every
node, regardless of when the node is infected.
Another common adversarial model is the spy-based ad-
versary, which observes exact timestamps for a corrupted
set of nodes that does not include the source [29, 40]. In our
notation, for a set of spies S ⊆ V , the spy-based adversary
observes {(s,Xs) : s ∈ S}. This is different from the eaves-
dropper adversary because the eavesdropper only observes
delayed timestamps, and it does so for all nodes, including
the source. Precise analysis of the spy-based adversary has
not appeared in the literature.
Neither of these prior adversarial models adequately cap-
tures the recent supernode-based deanonymization attacks
on the Bitcoin network [8, 19]. Indeed, we shall see that the
eavesdropper adversary requires different analytical tech-
niques from traditional adversarial models. On the other
hand, some of the techniques we will use to analyze the
eavesdropper adversary can be applied to traditional adver-
saries (Sec. 5).
Source Estimation. The adversary’s goal is as follows:
given the observed noisy timestamps τ (up to estimation
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time t) and the server graph G, find an estimator M(τ , G)
that correctly identifies the true source. Our metric of suc-
cess for the adversary is probability of detection. Given
an estimator M, the adversary’s probability of detection is
P(M(τ , G) = v∗). The probability is taken over the random
spreading realization (captured by τ ).
In [8, 19], the adversary’s estimator is a variant of the so-
called first-timestamp estimator. The first-timestamp
estimator MFT(τ , G) outputs the first node (prior to estima-
tion time t) to report the message to the adversary:
MFT(τ , G) = arg min
v∈Vt
τv.
The first-timestamp estimator is popular because of its sim-
plicity: it requires no knowledge of the graph, and it is com-
putationally easy to implement. Despite its simplicity, the
first-timestamp estimator achieves high accuracy rates in
practice [8, 19]. We begin by analyzing this estimator for
both trickle and diffusion propagation.
In principle, the adversary could implement more compli-
cated estimators that utilize the underlying graph structure.
We are particularly interested in the maximum-likelihood
(ML) estimator, which maximizes the adversary’s proba-
bility of detection:
MML(τ , G) = arg max
v∈V
P(τ |G, v∗ = v).
The ML estimator depends on the time of estimation t to
the extent that τ only contains timestamps up to time t.
Unlike the first-timestamp estimator, the ML estimator dif-
fers across spreading protocols, depends on the graph, and
may be computationally intractable. We nonetheless bound
its performance for both trickle and diffusion spreading over
regular trees.
2.4 Problem Statement
Our primary goal is to understand whether the Bitcoin
community’s move from trickle spreading to diffusion actu-
ally improved the system’s anonymity guarantees. As such,
our main problem is to characterize the maximum-likelihood
(ML) probability of detection of the eavesdropper adversary
for both trickle and diffusion processes on d-regular trees, as
a function of degree d, number of corrupted connections θ,
and detection time t. We meet this goal by computing lower
bounds derived from the analysis of suboptimal estimators
(e.g., first-timestamp estimator and centrality-based estima-
tors), and upper bounds derived from fundamental limits on
detection.
3. ANALYSIS OF TRICKLE (PRE-2015)
We begin by analyzing the probability of detection of
trickle spreading. We first consider the first-timestamp es-
timator, followed by the ML estimator.
3.1 First-Timestamp Estimator
The analysis of trickle propagation is complicated by its
combinatorial, time-dependent nature. As such, we begin by
lower-bounding the first-timestamp estimator’s probability
of detection. We do so by computing the probability that
the true source reports the message strictly before any other
node. Let
τm , min(τ1, τ2, . . .)
denote the minimum observed timestamp among nodes that
are not the source. Then we compute P(τ0 < τm), i.e., the
probability that the true source reports the message to the
adversary strictly before any of the other nodes. This event
(which causes the source to be detected with probability
1) does not include cases where the true source is one of
k nodes (k > 1) that report the message to the adversary
simultaneously, and before any other node in the system.
Since P(τ0 < τm) does not account for such ‘simultaneous
reporting’ events, it is a lower bound. Nonetheless, for large
d, the ‘simultaneous reporting’ event is rare, so our lower
bound is close to the empirical probability of detection of
the first-timestamp estimator.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a message that propagates ac-
cording to trickle spreading over a d-regular tree of honest
servers, where each node additionally has θ connections to
an eavesdropping adversary. The first-timestamp estima-
tor’s probability of detection at time t =∞ satisfies
P(MFT(τ , G) = v
∗) ≥ θ
d log 2
[
Ei(2d log ρ)− Ei (log ρ)
]
(1)
where ρ = d−1
d−1+θ , Ei(·) denotes the exponential integral, de-
fined as
Ei(x) , −
∫ ∞
−x
e−tdt
t
,
and all logarithms are natural logs.
(Proof in Section B.1)
We prove this bound by conditioning on the time at which
the source reports to the adversary, and computing the con-
ditional probability that all other nodes report later. The
proof then becomes a combinatorial counting problem.
Implications. We can approximate the asymptotic behav-
ior of equation (1) for large d by using the exponential inte-
gral’s Taylor expansion. First, we note that when d is large,
Ei(2d log ρ) ≈ 0, so we have
θ
d log 2
[
Ei(2d log ρ)− Ei (log ρ)
]
≈ θ
d log 2
(
−γ − log |log ρ| −
∞∑
ν=1
(log ρ)ν
ν · ν!
)
(2)
≈ θ
d log 2
(
−γ − log log
(
1 +
θ
d
)
+ log(1 +
θ
d
)
− log
2(1 + θ
d
)
4
+ . . .
)
(3)
≈ θ
d log 2
(
−γ − log θ
d
+
θ
d
− θ
2
4d2
+ . . .
)
(4)
where γ ≈ 0.577 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant [39], and
(2) comes from substituting the exponential integral by its
Taylor expansion for real arguments [6]. Line (3) holds be-
cause as d → ∞, ρ ≈ 1
1+θ/d
, and (4) holds because as
d→∞, log(1 + θ
d
) ≈ θ
d
.
In particular, for the special case of θ = 1 where the ad-
versary establishes only one connection per server, line (4)
simplifies to
P(MFT(τ , G)) ≈
log d
d · log 2 + o
(
log d
d
)
. (5)
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Figure 2: First-timestamp estimator accuracy on d-regular
trees when the adversary has one link per server (θ = 1).
This suggests that the first-timestamp estimator has a prob-
ability of detection that decays to zero asymptotically as
log(d)/d. Intuitively, the probability of detection should de-
cay to zero, because the higher the degree of the tree, the
higher the likelihood that a node other than the source re-
ports to the adversary before the source does. Nonetheless,
(5) is only a lower bound on the first-timestamp’s proba-
bility of detection, so we wish to understand how tight the
bound is.
Simulation Results. To evaluate the lower bound in The-
orem 3.1 and the approximation in (5), we simulate the first-
timestamp estimator on regular trees. Figure 2 illustrates
the simulation results for θ = 1 compared to the approxi-
mation in (5). Each data point is averaged over 5,000 trials.
In practice, the lower bound appears to be tight, especially
as d grows.
Figure 2 and approximation (5) suggest a natural solution
to the Bitcoin network’s anonymity problems: increase the
degree of each node to reduce the adversary’s probability of
detection. However, we shall see in the next section that
stronger estimators (e.g., the ML estimator) may achieve
high probabilities of detection, even for large d. Therefore,
the trickle protocol is unlikely to adequately protect users’
anonymity.
3.2 Maximum-Likelihood Estimator
In this section, we identify an ML source estimator for
finite detection time t, which uses the graph structure and
timestamps to infer the source. We analyze its limiting prob-
ability of detection as t → ∞, and show that it achieves a
probability of detection lower-bounded by 1/2, regardless of
the degree of the tree. This highlights the weakness of trickle
propagation when the adversary knows the graph. We begin
with a discussion of the ML estimator.
As the message spreads, it reaches some nodes before oth-
ers. At any time t, if one knew the ground truth timestamps
(i.e., the Xv’s), one could arrange the nodes of the infected
subgraph Gt in the order they received the message. We call
such an arrangement an ordering of the nodes. Since trickle
propagation is a discrete-time system, multiple nodes may
receive the message simultaneously, in which case they are
lumped together in the ordering. Of course, the true or-
dering is not observed by the adversary, but the observed
timestamps (i.e., τ ) restrict the set of possible orderings.
A feasible ordering is an ordering that respects the rules of
trickle propagation over graph G, as well as the observed
timestamps τ . In this subsection only, we will abuse nota-
tion by using τ to refer to all timestamps observed by the
adversary, not just the first timestamp from each server. So
if the adversary has θ connections to each server, τ would
include θ timestamps per honest server.
We propose an estimator called timestamp rumor cen-
trality, which counts the number of feasible orderings orig-
inating from each candidate source. The candidate with the
most feasible orderings is chosen as the estimator output.
This estimator is similar to rumor centrality, an estimator
devised for snapshot adversaries in [34]. However, the pres-
ence of timestamps and the lack of knowledge of the infected
subgraph complicates matters. We first motivate timestamp
rumor centrality, then show that it is the ML source estima-
tor for trickle spreading under an eavesdropper adversary.
Proposition 3.2. Consider a trickle process over a d-
regular graph, where each node has θ connections to the
eavesdropper adversary. Any feasible orderings o1 and o2
with respect to observed timestamps τ and graph G have the
same likelihood.
(Proof in Section B.2)
This claim can be proved with an inductive argument,
which shows that at any given time, the number of nodes
with a given uninfected degree, or number of uninfected neigh-
bors, is deterministic—i.e., it does not depend on the under-
lying ordering. Moreover, the likelihood of a given ordering
is strictly a function of the nodes’ uninfected degrees at each
time step, so all feasible orderings have the same likelihood.
Proposition 3.2 implies that at any fixed time, the like-
lihood of observing τ given a candidate source is propor-
tional to the number of feasible orderings originating from
that candidate source. Therefore, an ML estimator, which
we call timestamp rumor centrality, counts the number of
feasible orderings at finite estimation time t.
Timestamp rumor centrality is a message-passing algo-
rithm that proceeds as follows: for each candidate source,
recursively determine the set of feasible times when each
node could have been infected, given the observed times-
tamps. This is achieved by passing a set of “feasible times of
receipt”from the candidate source to the leaves of the largest
feasible subtree rooted at the candidate source. In each step,
nodes prune any times of receipt that conflict with their ob-
served timestamps. Next, given each node’s set of feasible
receipt times, they count the number of feasible orderings
that obey the rules of trickle propagation. This is achieved
by passing sets of partial orderings from the leaves back to
the candidate source, and pruning out infeasible orderings.
In practice, we do not pass the entire partial ordering; we
can instead store the number of distinct partial orderings
for the subtree rooted at each child, indexed by each fea-
sible time of receipt for the child (there are O(d) feasible
times of receipt). This reduces the overall computational
complexity to O((2d)d|V |): each node passes a message of
size O(d) to its parent, and each parent takes a Cartesian
product of its children’s messages. The whole procedure
is run for each candidate source, of which there are O(2d),
since the true source has a timestamp of at most d+ 1. Due
to the additional notation needed to describe timestamp ru-
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Figure 3: Example of ball centrality on a line with one link
to the adversary per server (these links are not shown). The
estimator is run at time t = 4.
mor centrality in detail, we defer a full-fledged pseudocode
description to Appendix B (Figure 9).
In [37], precise analysis of standard rumor centrality was
possible because rumor centrality can be reduced to a simple
counting problem. Such an analysis is more challenging for
timestamp rumor centrality, because timestamps prevent us
from using the same counting argument. However, we iden-
tify a suboptimal, simplified version of timestamp rumor
centrality that approaches optimal probabilities of detection
as t grows. We call this estimator ball centrality.
Unlike timestamp rumor centrality, ball centrality simply
checks whether a candidate source v could have generated
each of the observed timestamps, independently. We ex-
plain this in the context of an example. Figure 3 contains a
sample spread on a line graph, where the adversary has one
connection per server (not shown). Therefore, d = 2 and
θ = 1. The ground truth infection time is written as Xv
below each node, and the observed timestamps are written
above the node. In this figure, the estimator is run at time
t = 4, so the adversary only sees three timestamps. For each
observed timestamp τv, the estimator creates a ball of radius
τv − 1, centered at v. For example, in our figure, the green
node (node 1) has τ1 = 2. Therefore, the adversary would
make a ball of radius 1 centered at node 1; this ball is de-
picted by the green bubble in our figure. The ball represents
the set of nodes that are close enough to node 1 to feasibly
report to the adversary from node 1 at time τ1 = 2. After
constructing an analogous ball for every observed timestamp
in τ , the protocol outputs a source selected uniformly from
the intersection of these balls. In our example, there are
exactly two nodes in this intersection. We outline ball cen-
trality precisely in Protocol 1.
Although ball centrality is not ML for a fixed time t, the
following theorem lower bounds the ML probability of detec-
tion by analyzing ball centrality and showing that its prob-
ability of detection approaches a fundamental upper bound
exponentially fast in detection time t.
Protocol 1 Ball Centrality. Returns a source estimate
whose location is consistent with timestamps τ on tree G.
h(v, w) denotes the hop distance between v and w.
Input: Timestamps τ , graph G(V,E)
Output: Source estimate vˆ ∈ V
1: W ← V
2: for v ∈ V do . Find the intersection of feasible balls
3: W ←W ∩ {w ∈ V : h(w, v) ≤ τw − 1}
4: vˆ ∼ Unif(W )
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Figure 4: Timestamp rumor centrality (ML estimator) ac-
curacy on d-regular trees when the adversary has one link
per server (θ = 1). The estimator is run at time t = d+ 1.
Theorem 3.3. Consider a trickle spreading process over
a d-regular graph of honest servers. In addition, each server
has θ independent connections to an eavesdropper adversary.
The ML probability of detection at time t satisfies the follow-
ing two expressions:
(1) P(MML(τ , G) = v
∗) ≤ 1− d
2(θ+d)
(6)
(2) P(MML(τ , G) = v
∗) ≥ 1− d
2(θ+d)
−
(
d
θ+d
)t
(7)
(Proof in Section B.3)
To prove the upper bound, the key idea is as follows: in
the first time step, if a source infects an honest neighbor
instead of the adversary, then the true source and the honest
neighbor become indistinguishable to the adversary. This is
because the spreading processes from each node after that
first time step become identically distributed. This gives
an upper bound on the probability of detection. For the
lower bound, the key idea is that if we wait long enough,
the ball estimator will eventually return an intersection of
balls containing at most two nodes: the source and the first
honest neighbor to whom it passed the message. We can
characterize the probability of this happening as a function
of time, which lower bounds the ML probability of detection.
We make a few additional remarks about Theorem 3.3:
(1) The right-hand side of equation (6) is always greater
than 1
2
, regardless of θ. As such, increasing the degree of
the graph would not significantly reduce the probability of
detection—the adversary can still identify the source with
probability at least 1
2
, given enough time.
(2) The ML probability of detection approaches its upper
bound exponentially fast in time t. This suggests that the
adversary can, in practice, achieve high probabilities of de-
tection at small times t. For example, Figure 4 shows the
probability of detection of timestamp rumor centrality, as
a function of d, for θ = 1. The estimator is run at time
t = d + 1. Even at such small timestamps, the probability
of detection is empirically close to the upper bound in (6).
These results highlight a simple but important point: es-
timators that exploit graph structure can significantly in-
crease the accuracy of an estimator, up to order-level gains.
6
4. ANALYSIS OF DIFFUSION (POST-2015)
Having studied the anonymity properties of trickle spread-
ing, we now move to diffusion, a spreading mechanism adopted
by the Bitcoin community in 2015 in response to the attacks
demonstrated on the trickle spreading mechanism [1]. We
wish to understand whether diffusion has better anonymity
properties than trickle propagation. However, the main chal-
lenge is that even on simple graphs like a line, computing
the exact likelihood of a candidate diffusion source is in-
tractable as the set of infected nodes grows. This is because
a node’s likelihood of being the source depends on the unob-
served times at which each node is infected—a state space
that grows exponentially in the graph size. As such, it is
challenging to characterize the ML probability of detection
in closed form. Instead, we will compute lower bounds on
the ML probability of detection by analyzing two achiev-
able estimation schemes: the first-timestamp estimator and
a heuristic estimator of our own creation, which we call the
reporting center estimator. We will see that these two es-
timators are complementary, in the sense that they detect
the source well for different regimes of degree d. Moreover,
they give detection probabilities of the same order as trickle
spreading.
4.1 First-timestamp estimator
Although the first-timestamp estimator does not use knowl-
edge of the underlying graph, its performance depends heav-
ily on the underlying graph structure. The following theo-
rem exactly characterizes its eventual probability of detec-
tion on a regular tree.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a diffusion process of rate λ = 1
over a d-regular tree, d > 2. Suppose an adversary observes
each node’s infection time with an independent, exponential
delay of rate λ2 = θ, θ ≥ 1. Then the following expression
describes the probability of detection for the first-timestamp
estimator at time t =∞:
P(MFT(τ , G) = v
∗) =
θ
d− 2 log
(
d+ θ − 2
θ
)
(8)
(Proof in Section B.4)
The proof follows from writing out P(τ0 < τm), condi-
tioned on all the unobserved infection times. This expression
can be written recursively, which admits a nonlinear differ-
ential equation that can be solved exactly. The expression
highlights a few points:
(1) For a fixed degree d, the probability of detection is
strictly positive as t → ∞. This observation is straight-
forward in our case (i.e., under the eavesdropper adversary),
but under different adversarial models (e.g., snapshot adver-
saries) it is not trivial to see that the probability of detection
is positive as t → ∞. Indeed, several papers are dedicated
to making exactly that point [36, 37].
(2) There is a law of diminishing returns with respect to θ:
for a fixed degree d, as θ increases, the rate of growth of
(8) decreases. Since θ represents the number of adversarial
connections per honest node, the adversary reaps the largest
gains from the first few connections it establishes per node.
(3) When θ = 1, i.e., the adversary has only one connection
per node, the probability of detection approaches log(d)/d
asymptotically in d. Note that this quantity tends to 0 as
d→∞, and it is order-equal to the probability of detection
of the first-timestamp adversary on the trickle protocol when
θ = 1 (cf. equation (5)).
Theorem 4.1 suggests that the Bitcoin community’s transi-
tion from trickle spreading to diffusion spreading does not
provide any order-level anonymity gains (asymptotically in
the degree of the graph), at least for the first-timestamp ad-
versary. Next, we would like to see whether the same is true
for estimators that use the graph structure.
4.2 Centrality-Based Estimators
We compute a different lower bound on the ML probabil-
ity of detection by analyzing a centrality-based estimator.
Unlike the first-timestamp estimator, this reporting central-
ity estimator uses the structure of the infected subgraph
by selecting a candidate source that is close to the center
(on the graph) of the observed timestamps. However, it
does not explicitly use the observed timestamps. Also unlike
the first-timestamp estimator, this centrality-based estima-
tor improves as the degree d of the underlying tree increases.
Indeed, it has a strictly positive probability of detection as
d → ∞, implying that the eavesdropper adversary has an
ML probability of detection that scales as Θ(1) in d. We
start by presenting the reporting centrality estimator, after
which we analyze its probability of detection.
Reporting centrality estimator. At a high level, the re-
porting centrality estimator works as follows: for each can-
didate source v, the estimator counts the number of nodes
that have reported to the adversary from each of the node v’s
adjacent subtrees. It picks a candidate source for which the
number of reporting nodes is approximately equal in each
subtree.
To make this precise, we introduce some notation. First,
suppose the infected subtree Gt is rooted at w; we use
Twv to denote the subtree of Gt that contains v and all of
v’s descendants, with respect to root node w. Consider a
random variable Yv(t), which is 1 if node v ∈ V has re-
ported to the adversary by time t, and 0 otherwise. We
let YTwv (t) =
∑
u∈Twv Yu(t) denote the number of nodes in
Twv that have reported to the adversary by time t. We use
Y (t) =
∑
v∈Vt Yv(t) to denote the total number of reporting
nodes in Gt at time t. Similarly, we use NTwv (t) to denote
the number of infected nodes in Twv (so NTwv (t) ≥ YTwv (t)),
and we let N(t) denote the total number of infected nodes
at time t (N(t) ≥ Y (t)).
For each candidate source v, we consider its d neighbors,
which comprise the set N (v). We define a node v’s reporting
centrality at time t—denoted Rv(t)—as follows:
Rv(t) =
{
1 if maxu∈N (v) YTvu (t) <
Y (t)
2
0 otherwise.
(9)
That is, a node’s reporting centrality is 1 if and only if each
of its adjacent subtrees has strictly fewer than Y (t)/2 re-
porting nodes. We say a node is a reporting center iff it has
a reporting centrality of 1. The estimator outputs a node
vˆ chosen uniformly from the set of reporting centers. For
example in Figure 5, there is only one reporting center, v∗.
Notice that reporting centrality does not use the adver-
sary’s observed timestamps—it only counts the number of
reporting nodes in each of a node’s adjacent subtrees. This
estimator is inspired by rumor centrality [36], an ML esti-
mator for the source of a diffusion process under a snapshot
adversary. Recall that a snapshot adversary sees the infected
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Rv∗(t) = 1
Rw(t) = 0
Y (t) = 5
N(t) = 7
Figure 5: Reporting centrality example. Yellow nodes are
infected; a red outline means the node has reported. In this
example, v∗ has Rv∗(t) = 1 because each of its adjacent
subtrees has fewer than Y (t)/2 = 2.5 reporting nodes.
subgraph Gt at time t, but it does not learn any timestamp
information.
Rumor centrality exhibits a key property on trees: a node
v is a rumor center of a tree-structured infected subgraph
Gt if and only if each of the d adjacent subtrees adjacent
has no more than N(t)/2 nodes in it [36]:
max
u∈N (v)
NTvu (t) ≤
N(t)
2
. (10)
Moreover, there exists at least one and at most two rumor
centers in a tree, and the true source has a strictly positive
probability of being a rumor center on regular trees and
geometric random trees [36]. In our case, we cannot use
rumor centrality directly because the true infected nodes are
not all observed at any point in time t. We construct the
reporting centrality estimator by applying a condition like
(10) to the reporting nodes, rather than the infected nodes.
Analysis. We show that for trees with high degree d, re-
porting centrality has a strictly higher (in an order sense)
probability of detection than the first-timestamp estimator;
its probability of detection is strictly positive as d→∞.
Theorem 4.2. Consider a diffusion process of rate λ = 1
over a d-regular tree. Suppose this process is observed by
an eavesdropper adversary, which sees each node’s times-
tamp with an independent exponential delay of rate λ2 = θ,
θ ≥ 1. Then the reporting centrality estimator has a (time-
dependent) probability of detection P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗) that
satisfies
lim inf
t→∞
P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗) ≥ Cd > 0. (11)
where
Cd = 1− d
(
1− I1/2
(
1
d− 2 , 1 +
1
d− 2
))
is a constant that depends only on degree d, and I1/2(a, b) is
the regularized incomplete Beta function, i.e., the probability
a Beta random variable with parameters a and b takes a
value in [0, 1
2
).
Proof Sketch: (Full proof in Section B.5) The proof begins
by conditioning on the event that the true source is a report-
ing center. We demonstrate that this occurs with a prob-
ability that is lower-bounded by a constant. Conditioned
on this event, the probability of detection is 1, since there
can exist at most one reporting center. Combining all these
observations gives the lower bound in the claim.
The key step in this proof is demonstrating that the source
is a reporting center with probability lower-bounded by a
constant. To show this, we relate two Po`lya urn processes:
one that represents the diffusion process over the regular
tree of honest nodes, and one that describes the full spread-
ing process, which includes both diffusion over the regular
tree and random reporting to the adversary. The first urn
can be posed as a classic Po`lya urn [12], which has been
studied in the context of diffusion [37, 18]. However, the
second urn can be described by an unbalanced generalized
Po`lya urn (GPU) with negative coefficients—a class of urns
that does not typically appear in the study of diffusion (to
the best of our knowledge). In GPUs, upon drawing a ball
of a given color, one can add balls of a different color or even
remove balls; ‘unbalanced’ means that the number of balls
added in each timestep is not necessarily equal. Prior results
by Athreya and Ney [5] and later Janson [16] characterize
the limiting distribution of unbalanced GPUs with negative
coefficients, which allows us to relate the reporting central-
ity of our process to the rumor centrality of the underlying
(unobserved) diffusion process.
Notice that the constant Cd in Theorem 4.2 does not de-
pend on θ—this is because the reporting centrality estimator
makes no use of timestamp information, so the noisy delays
in the observed timestamps do not affect the estimator’s
asymptotic behavior. The delay does affect the convergence
rate of the probability of detection. Characterizing this de-
pendency is theoretically interesting, but beyond the scope
of this paper.
Simulation results. To evaluate the tightness of the lower
bound in Theorem 4.2, we simulate reporting centrality on
diffusion processes over regular trees. Figure 6 illustrates
the empirical performance of reporting centrality averaged
over 4,000 trials, compared to the theoretical lower bound
on the liminf. The estimator is run at time t = d + 2. Our
simulations are run up to degree d = 5 due to computational
constraints, since the infected subgraph grows exponentially
in the degree of the tree. We observe that by degree d = 5,
reporting centrality reaches the theoretical lower bound on
the limiting detection probability.
4.3 First-Timestamp vs. Centrality
Neither of the lower bounds from the first-timestamp or
reporting centrality estimators strictly outperforms the other.
The first-timestamp estimator performs better on graphs
with low degree d, whereas reporting centrality performs
better in the high-d regime. By taking the maximum of
these two estimators, we obtain a lower bound on the ML
probability of detection for diffusion processes across the full
range of degrees. Fully characterizing this probability of de-
tection remains an interesting open problem for future work.
Figure 6 compares the two estimators both in simulation
and theoretically as a function of degree d. We observe that
reporting centrality outstrips first-timestamp estimation for
trees of degree 9 and higher; since our theoretical result is
only a lower bound on the performance of reporting cen-
trality, the transition may actually occur at even smaller
d. Empirically, the true Bitcoin graph is approximately 8-
regular [24], a regime in which we expect reporting central-
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Figure 6: Comparison of first-timestamp and reporting cen-
trality estimators on diffusion over regular trees, theoreti-
cally and simulated. Here θ = 1
d
and t = d+ 2.
ity to perform similarly to the first-timestamp estimator.
Since the practical attacks in [8, 19] use the suboptimal
first-timestamp estimator, they may underestimate the ML
probability of detection.
5. DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide a comprehensive comparison
of trickle and diffusion, both theoretically and in simula-
tion. We also highlight some mathematical subtleties in our
analyses, which give rise to a number of open problems of
independent interest.
5.1 Comparison: Trickle vs. Diffusion
For direct comparison, Table 2 contains our theoretical
results side-by-side, for the special case of θ = 1 and for
general θ. As we have previously stated, the performance
of trickle and diffusion are similar, particularly when θ =
1. Although the maximum-likelihood results are difficult to
compare at first glance, the point is that they both approach
a positive constant as d, t→∞; for trickle propagation, that
constant is 1
2
, whereas for diffusion, it is approximately 0.307
(Corollary 1 from [37]).
Up to now, we have primarily considered the performance
of trickle and diffusion as a function of degree d. However,
in practice, the underlying Bitcoin graph is fixed; the only
variable quantity is the adversary’s resources, which are cap-
tured by θ, the number of corrupted connections per honest
node. However, it does not make sense to study the asymp-
totic probability of detection as θ → 0, since θ ≥ 1; on the
other hand, as θ →∞, the probability of detection tends to
1, regardless of spreading protcol. We therefore wish to nu-
merically understand, for a fixed d, how diffusion and trickle
compare as a function of θ. Figure 7 compares analytical
expressions and simulation results for the first-timestamp
estimator on 4-regular trees.
We use the first-timestamp estimator for a few reasons:
first, we lack an efficient ML estimator for diffusion. Second,
the transition from trickle to diffusion was motivated by the
practical attacks in [8, 19], which used a version of the first-
timestamp estimator. Third, even under the first-timestamp
estimator, the probability of detection is unacceptably high.
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Figure 7: Comparison of trickle and diffusion under the first-
timestamp estimator on 4-regular trees.
Note that our theoretical results suggest a higher prob-
ability of detection for diffusion than for trickle. This is
an artifact of our lower bound on the trickle probability
of detection. Recall that our lower bound computes the
probability that v∗ reports strictly before any other node
(i.e., simultaneous events are discarded). Since Figure 7 is
plotted for a small degree d = 4, simultaneous reporting
occurs frequently, so the lower bound is loose. In simu-
lation, we find that trickle and diffusion actually exhibit
nearly identical performance, which agrees with the theo-
retical probability of detection for diffusion. Moreover, we
verified our trickle lower bound in simulation by discarding
realizations where multiple nodes report simultaneously at
the first timestamp; these simulation results (burgundy line
in Figure 7) align closely with our theoretical prediction.
We also find that as d increases, the gap between our trickle
lower bound and the simulated probability of detection for
trickle decreases. Meanwhile, the similarity between diffu-
sion and trickle (in simulation) persists even for high d—at
least on regular trees.
Real Bitcoin graph. The real Bitcoin network is not a
regular tree. To validate our decision to analyze regular
trees, we simulate trickle and diffusion propagation over a
snapshot of the real Bitcoin network from 2015 [24]. Figure
8 compares these results as a function of θ, for the first-
timestamp estimator. Since the Bitcoin graph is not tree-
structured, we lack ML estimators for both diffusion and
trickle; hence, the first-timestamp estimator is a reasonable
choice. Unless specified otherwise, the theoretical curves
are calculated for a regular tree with d = 8, since this is the
mean degree of our dataset.
We first observe that the simulated performance of dif-
fusion is close to our theoretical prediction. This occurs
because with high probability, the first-timestamp estima-
tor uses only on a local neighborhood to estimate v∗. Since
the Bitcoin graph can be approximated by a sparse, random,
regular graph, the graph is locally tree-like with high prob-
ability, so our theoretical analysis of regular trees applies.
However, our trickle lower bound remains loose. This is
partially due to simultaneous reporting events, but the main
contributing factor seems to be the irregularity of the under-
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Table 2: Summary of probability of detection results on a network of honest servers in a d-regular tree topology. The adversary
has θ connections to each honest server.
Trickle Diffusion
First-
Timestamp
All θ θ
d log 2
[
Ei(2d log ρ)− Ei (log ρ)] (Thm 3.1) θ
d−2 log
(
d+θ−2
θ
)
(Thm. 4.1)
θ = 1 log(d)
d log(2)
+ o
(
log d
d
)
(Eq. 5) log(d−1)
(d−2) (Thm. 4.1)
Maximum-
Likelihood
All θ 1− d
2(θ+d)
(Thm 3.3) 1− d
(
1− I1/2
(
1
d−2 , 1 +
1
d−2
))
θ = 1 1− d
2(d+1)
(Thm. 3.3) (Thm. 4.2)
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Figure 8: Comparison of trickle and diffusion spreading un-
der the first-timestamp estimator, simulated on a 2015 snap-
shot of the real Bitcoin network [24].
lying graph. It appears that trickle responds more acutely
to graph irregularities than diffusion, presumably due to its
more structured nature, which we exploited heavily in our
analysis. Indeed, we find that the simulated performance of
trickle is close to the theoretical predictions for regular trees
of degree d = 2 (black line in Figure 8); d = 2 happens to be
the mode of the dataset degree distribution. Understanding
this effect more carefully is an interesting question for future
work.
Second, we observe that empirically, the probability of
detection for diffusion is indeed lower than that of trickle
spreading. This suggests that the Bitcoin developers’ in-
tuition was correct—diffusion has slightly better anonymity
properties than trickle. Still, the difference is small. Notice
that in Figure 8, diffusion and trickle become increasingly
similar as the number of corrupted connections increases. In
practical attacks [8], the eavesdropper was able to establish
as many as 50 connections to some nodes. In that regime,
Figure 8 suggests that trickle and diffusion would have very
similar (high) probabilities of detection, even for the sub-
optimal first-timestamp estimator. Thus, even in a numeric
sense, diffusion and trickle are not substantially different
under practical adversarial operating conditions.
In summary, we find that trickle and diffusion have proba-
bilities of detection that are similar, both in an asymptotic-
order sense and in a numeric sense, as seen in both simula-
tion and theoretical analysis. We have evaluated this on the
canonical class of d-regular trees and, through simulation,
on a real Bitcoin graph topology.
5.2 Open Problems
Several of our analyses suggest open problems that are
interesting in their own right. For instance, in our analysis
of diffusion, the exact ML probability of detection remains
unknown. Moreover, it is unclear if an efficient (polynomial-
time in the number of nodes) ML estimator exists. Even our
analysis of reporting centrality—a suboptimal estimator—
gives only a lower bound on the limiting probability of de-
tection, and its convergence rate as a function of θ and d is
not known. These open problems are all directly related to
the goals of this paper.
Relation to other adversarial models. Another sub-
class of open problems relates to connecting the eavesdrop-
per adversary to more well-known, canonical adversarial mod-
els. That is, the eavesdropper adversary can be thought of
as a generalization of certain adversarial models, like the
spy-based adversary and the snapshot adversary.
Recall that in the spy-based adversary, each node other
than the source is corrupt with probability p, and corrupt
nodes observe the exact timestamp at which they receive the
message. This setting can be represented by an eavesdropper
adversary with random observation delays: either the node
reports with an instantaneous delay, or it reports with an
infinite delay.
On the other hand, in the snapshot adversary, the adver-
sary learns only which nodes are infected at observation time
t, not their timestamps. This is similar to an eavesdropper
adversary in which the random reporting delays have high
variance. As such, the timestamp has little value beyond
indicating that the reporting node is infected.
The similarities between the eavesdropper adversary and
these canonical models may be useful to the extent that we
can study one to gain intuition about the other. For exam-
ple, we can use techniques developed for the eavesdropper
adversary to study the spy-based adversary. The ML prob-
ability of detection for the spy-based adversary on regular
trees has evaded exact analysis [13], though several heuris-
tics have been found to work well [29, 40]. A simple lower
bound on the ML probability of detection comes from an-
alyzing the first-timestamp estimator for the spy-based ad-
versary [13]. This gives
lim inf
t→∞
P(MFT(τ , G) = v
∗) ≥ p, (12)
since with probability p, the first node to receive the mes-
sage is a spy. Although reporting centrality is a subopti-
mal source estimator for the eavesdropper adversary, it is
straightforward to analyze and can be used to obtain lower
bounds on the probability of detection for the spy-based ad-
versary.
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Using similar proof techniques to Theorem 4.2, we can
lower-bound the spy-based adversary’s ML probability of
detection as time t→∞.
Corollary 5.1. Consider a diffusion process of rate λ =
1 over a d-regular tree. Suppose this process is observed by
an spy-based adversary, which sees the exact timestamp of
each node independently with probability p > 0 (otherwise it
sees nothing). Then the reporting centrality estimator has a
probability of detection P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗) that satisfies
lim inf
t→∞
P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗) ≥ Cd > 0, (13)
where
Cd = 1− d
(
1− I1/2
(
1
d− 2 , 1 +
1
d− 2
))
.
(Proof in Section B.6)
The key point to notice about Corollary 5.1 is that (13)
remains positive for a fixed d even as p → 0; this is in
contrast with the previously-known equation (12). Keep in
mind that we are first taking the limit as t→∞ for a fixed
p, then taking p → 0. It is not possible to exchange the
order of these limits; doing so drives the probability of de-
tection to zero. The reason is that for a finite t (and hence
a finite number of infected nodes), as p→ 0, the number of
spies in the infected subgraph also tends to zero. Without
any observations, it is impossible to detect the source. How-
ever, for any fixed positive p > 0, as t→∞, eventually the
number of spies in each subtree concentrates, so reporting
centrality has a nonzero probability of detection. Indeed,
our analysis makes critical use of the fact that as t→∞, for
a fixed positive p, the classical Po`lya urn we use to represent
the underlying diffusion process concentrates.
Although the lower bound in (13) does not depend on p,
the convergence rate does; again, understanding this conver-
gence rate is of theoretical interest. More broadly, a deeper
understanding of the similarities between the eavesdropper
adversary and other canonical adversarial models is needed.
6. RELATEDWORK
There are two primary categories of related work, which
originate from the security and network-analysis communi-
ties, respectively. The first concerns the anonymity proper-
ties of bitcoin (and related cryptocurrencies). The second
studies rumor source detection under canonical adversarial
and graph models.
Bitcoin and Anonymity. Bitcoin has long been known to
exhibit poor anonymity properties. Many papers have ex-
plored the anonymity implications of having a public blockchain.
In particular, pseudonyms can often be linked together (im-
plying common ownership) with simple, heuristic clustering
methods. For instance, Bitcoin transactions are allowed to
have multiple inputs; in practice, the multiple input pseudonyms
are often owned by the same entity. Using this and other
simple heuristics, researchers have been able to cluster pseudo-
nyms in the wild [4, 23, 31, 32, 28]. Since some nodes are al-
ready deanonymized (e.g., public vendors), transaction pat-
terns can be used to learn the identities of other users. More
recently, researchers have demonstrated attacks on the ac-
tual P2P network [8, 19], as discussed in Section 2.
In response to blockchain-enabled deanonymization threats,
several papers have proposed anonymous alternatives to Bit-
coin; these alternatives typically rely on privacy-preserving
cryptographic protocols. For example, a new cryptocur-
rency called Zcash [3] uses the Zerocash protocol [33], which
cryptographically masks transactions in the blockchain and
proves validity using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.
Although Zcash obfuscates more information than Bitcoin,
the masked transactions are still broadcast over the P2P
network using the same protocols as Bitcoin. Hence, an
eavesdropper adversary could still learn the IP address that
originates each transaction.
Another recently-proposed solution is TumbleBit, an un-
trusted payment hub that can be used for the anonymous
transferral of bitcoins [15]. Unlike Zcash, part of the Tum-
bleBit protocol occurs off-blockchain, which prevents tracing
attacks by an eavesdropper adversary. However, the sender
and receiver still conduct blockchain operations to escrow
and retrieve bitcoins at the beginning and end of each trans-
action, respectively; these operations use the usual Bitcoin
P2P networking protocol, and could be deanonymized (in
principle) by a payment hub that also acts as an eavesdrop-
per adversary. In summary, several anonymity-preserving
altcoins are vulnerable to the kinds of attacks outlined in
this paper, despite their strong cryptographic guarantees at
the application layer.
Rumor Source Detection. The last five years have seen
significant work on detecting the source of a diffusion pro-
cess over a graph. This topic became popular following the
2010 results of Shah and Zaman, who showed that under
a snapshot adversary on a regular tree, one can reliably
infer the source of a diffusion process [34]. That is, the
probability of detection is lower-bounded by a constant as
t → ∞. The analysis for these results uses the same Po`lya
urn construction that we adopt in the proofs of Theorem 4.2
and Corollary 5.1 [36, 35]. Shah and Zaman later extended
these results to random, irregular trees [37], and other au-
thors studied heuristic source detection methods on general
graphs [14, 30, 20] and related theoretical limits [38, 25, 18].
Follow-up research has considered several variants on the
snapshot adversary. For example, Pinto et al. considered a
spy-based adversary that observes a diffusion process where
the delays are truncated Gaussian random variables [29], and
Zhu and Ying consider a spy-based adversary with standard
exponential delays [40]. These papers do not characterize
the ML probability of detection, but they do propose effi-
cient heuristics that perform well in practice. Our work in-
stead analyzes the eavesdropper adversary, a new adversar-
ial model that emerged from practical attacks on the Bitcoin
network [8, 19]. As we saw in various theoretical results, the
eavesdropper adversary requires completely new analytical
tools compared to the spy-based and snapshot adversaries.
Similarly, there has been extensive work on alternative
spreading models. In particular, researchers have studied
various forms of diffusion, in which nodes can “recover from
the infection”—i.e., they can delete the transaction before
it reaches the entire network. The classic diffusion process
is often called susceptible-infected (SI): nodes start as sus-
ceptible, and once they become infected, they remain so for
the rest of time. Alternative models include susceptible-
infected-susceptible (SIS) diffusion, in which nodes recover
from the infection with a random delay and can then be
re-infected, and susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) diffu-
sion, in which nodes recover with an exponential delay, upon
which they are immune to future infection. These models
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have been studied in the literature, both theoretically and
empirically [41, 11, 42, 7]. In our work, we consider only
classical SI diffusion processes, but we also consider the com-
pletely new trickle spreading protocol. As we have seen in
Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, the theoretical machinery for analyz-
ing trickle spreading differs significantly from that used to
analyze diffusion. The differences arise from the combinato-
rial nature of trickle spreading.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze the anonymity properties of the
Bitcoin P2P network, with particular attention to the shift
from trickle to diffusion propagation in 2015. We find that
trickle and diffusion have similar (poor) anonymity proper-
ties. On regular trees, they exhibit the same scaling prop-
erties asymptotically in d, and numerically similar proba-
bilities of detection for a fixed d. In simulation over a real
Bitcoin graph topology, diffusion and trickle also exhibit nu-
merically similar performance, which agrees with our theo-
retical predictions. This leads us to conclude that the cur-
rent flooding protocols used in the Bitcoin network do not
sufficiently protect user anonymity.
An interesting question is how to modify the networking
stack in order to provide robustness to source deanonymiza-
tion attacks. Although the design of such solutions is beyond
the scope of this paper, our analysis gives some intuition for
how to prevent deanonymization attacks. A key reason that
deanonymization is currently possible is because of the sym-
metry of current spreading protocols. That is, diffusion and
trickle both propagate content over the underlying graph
in all directions at roughly the same rate. This symmetry
enables powerful centrality-based attacks. Thus, a natural
solution is to break the symmetry of diffusion and trickle.
Understanding how to break symmetry without hurting per-
formance is of both theoretical and practical interest.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS
B. ALGORITHMS
Timestamp rumor centrality is described in Protocol 9.
Here we have assumed that the adversary has only one link
per honest server, so θ = 1. This is easily extended to
general θ.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We can write this lower bound explicitly. Recall that the
system is discrete-time, and each node has d honest neigh-
bors and θ connections to the adversary. τi denotes the first
time node i reports to the adversary.
P(τ0 < τm) =
d+θ∑
i=1
P(τ0 = i)P(τm > i|τ0 = i) (14)
Since the source has only d honest connections, for any i >
(d + 1), it holds that P(τ0 = i) = 0, and if i = d + 1, then
τm ≤ i. So we can simplify this summation to
P(τ0 < τm) =
d∑
i=1
P(τ0 = i)P(τm > i|τ0 = i). (15)
This means we only need to consider the first d time steps
of the message spread in order to lower-bound the first-
timestamp adversary’s probability of detection. Let aj ,
P(τm = j|τ0 ≥ j) = P(τm = j|τ0 = i for any i ≥ j). Then
P(τm > i|τ0 = i) = 1−∑ij=1 aj , so
P(τ0 < τm) =
d∑
i=1
P(τ0 = i)−
d∑
i=1
P(τ0 = i)
i∑
j=1
aj
= 1− P(τ0 = d+ 1)−
d∑
i=1
P(τ0 = i)
i∑
j=1
aj .
(16)
Letting bk , P(τm > k | τ0 ≥ k, τm > (k − 1)) gives
aj = (1− bj)
j−1∏
k=1
bk. (17)
We can write bk explicitly by noting that as long as no in-
fected nodes have reported the message to the adversary, one
can deterministically compute the number of infected nodes
at each time step with a given number of infected (resp. un-
infected) neighbors. This is because the underlying graph is
a regular tree (see Lemma 3.2 for proof). LetN (k, t) denote
the set of nodes with k infected, honest neighbors at time
t. Then for a fixed time t, we can compute the probability
that every infected node chooses to infect an honest node in
the next time step, by indexing over the value of k:
bj =
j−1∏
k=1
( |{v ∈ V : uv,h(j) = k}|
|{v ∈ V : uv(j) = k}|
)|N (k,j)|
=
j−1∏
k=1
(
d− k
d− k + θ
)2j−1−k
where j > 1, and b1 = 1. Here, the quantity uv(j) (resp.
uv,h(j)) denotes the uninfected degree (resp. uninfected
honest degree) of node v at time j—that is, the number
of total (resp. honest), uninfected neighbors of a node. So
the ratio in the definition of bj is comparing the number
of nodes with honest uninfected degree k to the number of
nodes with uninfected degree k.
Substituting this quantity into Equation (17), we get
aj = (1− bj)
j−2∏
k=1
k∏
m=1
(
d−m
d−m+ θ
)2k−m
= (1− bj)
j−2∏
m=1
(
d−m
d−m+ θ
)∑j−m−2
`=0
2`
= (1− bj)
j−2∏
m=1
(
d−m
d−m+ θ
)2j−m−1−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mj
(18)
Rearranging, we get
Mj =
∏j−1
m=1
(
d−m
d−m+θ
)2j−1−m∏j−2
k=1
(
d−k+θ
d−k
)
d−j+1
d+θ−j+1
= bj
(
d+ θ − j + 1
d− j + 1
) j−2∏
k=1
(
d− k + θ
d− k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wj
Writing out the terms of Wj explicitly, we get that
Wj =
(d− 1 + θ)(d− 2 + θ) . . . (d− 1) . . . (d− j + 2 + θ)
(d− 1) . . . (d− j + 2 + θ) . . . (d− j + 2)
=
θ−1∏
m=0
d+m
d+m− j + 2 .
Substituting all of this into Equation (18), we get that
aj = (1− bj)bj
(
d− j + 1 + θ
d− j + 1
) θ−1∏
m=0
d+m
d+m− j + 2 .
This expression for aj can be used to rewrite (16):
P(τ0 < τm) = 1− P(τ0 = d+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PA
−
d∑
i=1
P(τ0 = i)
i∑
j=1
aj .
= 1− PA −
d∑
i=1
P(τ0 = i)
i∑
j=1
(1− bj)bj ×
d− j + 1 + θ
d− j + 1
θ−1∏
m=0
d+m
d+m− j + 2 . (19)
Setting
qj ,
d− j + 1 + θ
d− j + 1
θ−1∏
m=0
d+m
d+m− j + 2 ,
we get that
P(τ0 < τm) = 1− PA −
d∑
i=1
P(τ0 = i)
i∑
j=1
(1− bj)bjqj
= 1− PA −
d∑
i=1
P(τ0 = i)
(
i∑
j=2
bjqj −
i∑
j=2
b2jqj
)
(20)
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Figure 9: Timestamp Rumor Centrality. Returns the timestamp rumor centrality of candidate source v, given timestamps
τ on tree G. φ(w) denotes the children of node w on a tree T rooted at v. ∂T denotes the leaves of tree T .
Input: Timestamps τ , graph G, candidate source v, esti-
mation time t ≥ d+ 1
Output: Number feasible orderings from source v, fv
1: [d+ 1] , {1, . . . , d+ 1}
2: mvv ← {0}
3: . Two global variables, T and C:
4: T ← balanced tree of radius t, center v, over graph G
5: C ← dictionary of number of feasible partial orderings
for each feasible (w, Xˆw) pair
6: c =PassToLeaves(v, v, {0}, T )
7: return c . Timestamp rumor centrality for v
8:
9: function PassToLeaves(z, w,m, T ) . Each node
learns its possible receipt times, recursively
10: m(w)← m \ {t ∈ m : t ≥ τw} . Remove late times
11: Node w saves m(w) outside function scope
12: if w ∈ ∂T then
13: for t′ ∈ m do
14: C[w][t′]← 1 . Number of partial orderings
with w infected at time t′
15: else
16: m′ ← ∪i∈m(w){i+ j : j ∈ [d+ 1]}
17: m′ ← m′ \ {τw}
18: for y ∈ φ(w) do
19: PassToLeaves(w, y,m′)
20: AggregateMessages(w, φ(w))
21: if z = w = v∗ then
22: return C[v∗][0]
23:
24: function AggregateMessages(z, φ(z), T ) . Counts
the number of valid orderings by passing messages that
represent the set of feasible orderings
25: N ← [z, φ(z)] . Ordered list of parent and children
26: M ←∏u∈φ(z)m(u)
27: .
∏
denotes Cartesian set product, where
A×B , {(a, b) : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}
28: M ← m(w)×M . Prepends the current node’s
feasible receipt times to the Cartesian product
29: M ← {m ∈M : [(m1, . . . ,md) distinct]∧[|mi−mj |≤
d+ 1 for all i, j] ∧[m1 < mi for all i > 1]}
30: . Removes ordered tuples where neighbors
receive the message at the same time, are too far apart
to be feasible, or parent gets message after children. mi
denotes ith element of ordered tuple m
31: for m ∈M do
32: q ←∏di=2 C[Ni][mi] . Compute
the number of permutations by multiplying counts from
each child node
33: C[z][m1]← C[z][m1] + q
34: return
where the change of summation bounds in (20) occurs be-
cause b1 = 1. We define γk ,
(
d−k
d−k+θ
)2−k
, which means
that
bj =
j−1∏
k=1
γ2
j−1
k . (21)
Using this notation, we write out the two final summations
in (20) explicitly:
i∑
j=2
bjqj = q2γ
2
1 + q3γ
4
1γ
4
2 + q4γ
8
1γ
8
2γ
8
3 + . . .+ qiγ
2i−1
1 · · · γ2
i−1
i−1
(22)
i∑
j=2
b2jqj = q2γ
4
1 + q3γ
8
1γ
8
2 + q4γ
16
1 γ
16
2 γ
16
3 + . . .+ qiγ
2i
1 · · · γ2
i
i−1
(23)
Subtracting (22)-(23) and collecting terms gives
i∑
j=2
qj(bj − b2j ) = q2γ21 + γ41(q3γ42 − q2) + γ81γ82(q4γ83 − q3)+
. . .+ γ2
i−1
1 · · · γ2
i−1
i−2 (qiγ
2i−1
i−1 − qi−1)− qiγ2
i
1 · · · γ2
i
i−1
= q2γ
2
1 − qiγ2
i
1 · · · γ2
i
i−1 +
i∑
`=3
γ2
`−1
1 · · · γ2
`−1
`−2 (q`γ
2`−1
`−1 − q`−1).
(24)
First, we show that the summation (last term) in (24) is
equal to 0 by writing out (q`γ
2`−1
`−1 − q`−1):
q`γ
2`−1
`−1 − q`−1 = q`−1
(
d− `+ 1 + θ
d− `+ 1 γ
2`−1
`−1 − 1
)
= q`−1
(
d− `+ 1 + θ
d− `+ 1 ·
d− `+ 1
d− `+ 1 + θ − 1
)
= 0.
Next, we show that the first term in (24) equals 1 by writing
q2γ
2
1 explicitly:
q2γ
2
1 =
d− 2 + 1 + θ
d− 2 + 1
(
θ−1∏
m=0
d+m
d+m− 2 + 2
)
d− 1
d− 1 + θ = 1,
which implies that
i∑
j=1
qj(bj − b2j ) = 1− qiγ2
i
1 · · · γ2
i
i−1 = 1− b2i . (25)
Now, we can substitute (25) into (20), getting
P(τ0 < τm) = 1− PA −
d∑
i=2
P(τ0 = i)(1− qiγ2
i
1 · · · γ2
i
i−1)
=
θ
θ + d
+
d∑
i=2
P(τ0 = i)qiγ2
i
1 · · · γ2
i
i−1, (26)
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where (26) is because
d∑
i=2
P(τ0 = i) = 1− P(τ0 = d+ 1)− P(τ0 = 1)
= 1− PA − θ
θ + d
.
Note that P (τ0 = i) =
(N−iθ−1)
(Nθ )
, where N , d + θ. We can
also rewrite qi as
qi =
d− i+ 1 + θ
d− i+ 1
θ−1∏
m=0
d+m
d+m− i+ 2
=
d− i+ 1 + θ
d− i+ 1 ·
(d+ θ − 1)!
(d− 1)! ·
(d− i+ 1)!
(d+ θ + 1− i)! ·
θ!
θ!
=
(
N−1
θ
)(
N−i
θ
) .
Thus, the product of these terms is
P (τ0 = i)qi =
θ
N − i− θ + 1 ·
N − θ
N
=
θ
d− i+ 1 ·
d
θ + d
,
and the desired probability in (26) simplifies to
P(τ0 < τm) =
θ
θ + d
+
d∑
i=2
d
d− i+ 1 ·
θ
θ + d
b2i
=
θ
θ + d
[
1 + d
d∑
i=2
b2i
d− i+ 1
]
≥ θ
θ + d
[
1 +
d∑
i=2
b2i
]
(27)
≥ θ
θ + d
[
1 +
d−1∑
i=1
γ
∑i
k=1 2
k
1
]
(28)
=
θ
θ + d
[
1 +
d−1∑
i=1
γ2
i+1−2
1
]
≥ θ
d
d−1∑
i=0
γ2
i+1
1 (29)
where (27) comes from replacing d− i+1 with d, (28) comes
from replacing γk with γ1 since γk ≥ γ1, and (29) holds
because γ21 ≤ dd+θ . We lower-bound the doubly exponential
sum in (29) by integrating. Letting ρ = γ21 , we have
θ
d
d−1∑
i=0
(γ21)
2i ≥ θ
d
∫ d
0
ρ2
x
dx
=
θ
d log 2
(
Ei(2d log ρ2)− Ei(log ρ2)
)
where Ei(·) denotes the exponential integral. This gives the
desired result.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The proposition can be seen through a simple counting
argument. Let At denote the set of active nodes at time
t, or the set of all infected, honest nodes with at least one
uninfected neighbor (honest or adversarial). We also de-
fine the uninfected degree of a node uv(t) as the number
of uninfected neighbors of node v at time t. We define
At(i) = |{v ∈ V : uv(t) = i}|, i > 0, as the number of
active nodes at time t with uninfected degree i.
We claim that for a given regular tree G and set of ob-
served timestamps τ , and for any set of feasible orderings,
the number of nodes with uninfected degree i (i.e., At(i))
for a given i > 0 does not depend on the underlying order-
ing. This holds because the graph is regular; we can show
it formally by induction. At time t = 1, there are two op-
tions: either the source reports directly to the adversary, or
it spreads the message to an honest neighbor. It if reports
to the adversary, then in every feasible ordering, the source
must report to the adversary at t = 1. Therefore at the end
of time step t = 1, we have
At(i) =
{
1 if i = d+ θ − 1
0 otherwise.
If the source instead passes the message to an honest neigh-
bor (it doesn’t matter which one, and the identity of the
neighbor could vary across feasible orderings), then
At(i) =
{
2 if i = d+ θ − 1
0 otherwise,
because now we have two active nodes, each of which has
d+ θ − 1 uninfected neighbors.
Now take t > 1, and assume that at time t− 1, At(i) was
the same across all feasible orderings, for each i > 0. We
want to show that the same is true at time t. Every time an
active node v infects a neighbor node w, v’s own uninfected
degree decreases by one. If w is an honest node, it joins the
set of active nodes with uninfected degree uw(t) = d−1 +θ.
If w belongs to the eavesdropper, then it does not join the
active nodes. Suppose τ indicates that in time t, exactly m
nodes will report to the adversary. Since there were |At−1|
active nodes at time t, we know that |At−1|−m new active
nodes will be infected, each with degree d− 1 + θ, so At(d−
1 + θ) = |At−1|−m. Moreover, for all 0 < i < (d − 1 + θ),
we have At(i) = At−1(i + 1), since each previously-active
node decrements its uninfected degree by one. None of this
depends on the ordering, which proves that At(i) takes the
same value for any feasible ordering.
We write out the likelihood L(o) of a feasible ordering o:
L(o) =
t−1∏
j=1
∏
v∈Aj
1
uv(j)
,
since each active node infects exactly one uninfected neigh-
bor uniformly at random in each time step. By the previous
argument, this likelihood can equivalently be grouped by
nodes with the same uninfected degree u:
L(o) =
t∏
j=1
∏
u∈{1,...,d−1+θ}
(
1
u
)Aj(u)
.
Nothing in this expression depends on the ordering o (since
Aj(u) is independent of o), so the likelihood must be equal
for all feasible orderings.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
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We begin by showing that (6) is an upper bound on any
estimator’s probability of detection, and then show that ball
centrality achieves the lower bound in (7).
(1): Notice that with probability θ/(θ + d), the true source
reports the message to the adversary in the first time slot. If
this happens, then the conditional probability of detection is
1; since the adversary is assumed to know the starting time
of the trickle process, it can deduce that the true source
is the only possible source. However, if the source does not
report to the adversary in the first time slot, then the source
must instead pass the message to one of its honest neighbors.
In that case, at t = 1, exactly two nodes are infected, both of
which are honest. Thereafter, the spread from each of these
nodes is completely symmetric: both the true source and
the first neighbor are connected to identical graph structures
(i.e., two infinite trees rooted at each of the infected nodes),
and the message spreading dynamics from each of these two
nodes is identically-distributed. As such, no estimator can
distinguish between the true source and the first neighbor,
meaning the probability of detection is upper bounded by
1/2 in this case. Therefore, a simple upper bound for the
ML probability of detection is
P(MML(τ , G) = v
∗) ≤ θ
θ + d
(1) +
d
θ + d
(
1
2
)
= 1− d
2(θ + d)
.
(2): Next, we demonstrate that ball centrality has a proba-
bility of detection that is lower bounded by (7). Once again,
if the source immediately passes the message to the adver-
sary, then the adversary identifies a ball of size 1, so the
source gets caught with probability 1. This happens with
probability θ
θ+d
. Thus we need to compute the probability
of detection conditioned on the source passing the message
to an honest neighbor at t = 1. Suppose source v∗ passes
the message to its neighbor w at t = 1. Without loss of
generality, let us think of w and v∗ as the left and right re-
spective endpoints of a path. In each subsequent time step,
each of the endpoints of this path will forward the message
either to another honest node or to the adversary. If the left
(resp. right) endpoint q forwards the message to another
honest node z, then z becomes the left (resp. right) end-
point in the following time step; if q forwards the message
to the adversary, then the path terminates at q. This path
continues to grow until both ends have terminated.
We first show that the probability of the path terminating
is lower bounded by 1− 2
(1+θ/d)t−1 , then we show that con-
ditioned on path termination, the probability of detection is
lower bounded by 1/2. To analyze the probability of termi-
nation at time t, note that each end of the path terminates
after a geometrically-distributed number of hops. This holds
because each endpoint independently terminates with prob-
ability θ
θ+d−1 in each time step. Therefore, the probability
of both endpoints terminating by time t can be expressed as
P(B ≤ t)2 =
(
1−
(
1− θ
θ + d− 1
)t−1)2
,
≥
(
1−
(
d
θ + d
)t−1)2
≥ 1− 2
(
d
θ + d
)t−1
(30)
where B is a geometric random variable of rate θ
θ+d−1 .
Now, we show that conditioned on termination, the prob-
ability of detection is lower-bounded by 1
2
. We call x and y
left and right terminating endpoints, respectively (Fig. 10).𝑥 𝑦𝑤 𝑣 ∗ ……
Figure 10: Arrangement of nodes from the proof of Thm.
3.3.
Now, we show that the balls centered at nodes x and y
have an intersection of at most two nodes. The ball centered
at node x has a radius of τx − 1, and the ball centered at y
a radius of τy − 1. By construction, we know that the hop
distance between v∗ and x is h(v∗, x) = τx − 1 ≤ τx − 1 and
h(v∗, y) = τy − 2 ≤ τy − 1, so v∗ must lie in the intersection
of the two balls. Similarly, h(w, x) = τx − 2 ≤ τx − 1 and
h(w, y) = τy − 1 ≤ τy − 1, so w must lie in the intersection
of the two balls. Let us assume by contradiction that there
exists a third node z in the intersection of these two balls.
This implies that h(z, x) ≤ τx − 1 and h(z, y) ≤ τy − 1.
Either z lies on the shortest path between x and y, which we
denote P (x, y), or it does not. If z ∈ P (x, y), then it either
lies to the left of w or to the right of v∗. In either case, z is
excluded from the ball centered at y or x, respectively. Thus
it cannot lie on P (x, y). If z does not lie on P (x, y), then
there exists an alternative path P ′(x, y) 6= P (x, y) between
x and y of distance at most τx + τy − 2 that contains node
z; this path is allowed to traverse the same node or edge
multiple times. By construction, the hop distance between
x and y is h(x, y) = τx + τy − 3, so P ′(x, y) must have at
least this many hops. Moreover, since G is a tree, every path
between x and y must traverse each node in P (x, y). Since
P (x, y) already contains τx + τy − 3 edges, P ′(x, y) should
be no longer than τx + τy − 2, and it should also touch an
additional node z, P ′(x, y) must have exactly one more hop
than P (x, y). This eliminates all paths that move from node
r ∈ P (x, y) to node z /∈ P (x, y), then back to r again. But
this implies that there exist two distinct paths between x
and y in which no edge or vertex is traversed twice, which is
a contradiction since G is a tree. Hence there can be at most
two nodes in the intersection of balls, so the probability of
detection is at least 1/2 in this case.
Combining this with the lower bound in (30), we have
P(MBC(τ , G) = v
∗)
≥ θ
d+ θ
(1) +
1
d+ θ
· 1
2
·
(
1− 2
(
d
d+ θ
)t−1)
= 1− d
2(θ + d)
−
(
d
d+ θ
)t
.
Since the ML estimator performs at least as well as the ball
centrality estimator, the claim follows.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
To analyze the probability of detection under the first-
timestamp estimator, we consider probability of the true
source reporting before any other node, or P(τ0 < τm). We
use Ri to denote the random time delay between the infec-
tion times of i’s parent and i; by “parent”, we mean with
respect to the infected subtree Gt, which is rooted at node
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P(τ0 < τm) =
∫ ∞
t0=0
P(τ0 = t0)
[
P(R1 > t0) +
∫ t0
r1=0
P(R1 = r1)P(τ1 > (t0 − r1))×
[
P(R2 > (t0 − r1)) +
∫ t0−r1
r2=0
P(R2 = r2)P(τ2 > (t0 − r1 − r2)) [P(R3 > (t0 − r1 − r2)) + . . .]d−1
]d−1]d0
dt0
=
∫ ∞
0
λ2e
−λ2t0
[
e−λ1t0 +
∫ t0
0
λ1e
−λ1r1e−λ2(t0−r1)
[
e−λ1(t0−r1) +
∫ t0−r1
0
λ1e
−λ1r2e−λ2(t0−r1−r2)×
[
e−λ1(t0−r1−r2) + . . .
]d−1
dr2
]d−1
dr1
]d0
dt0 (31)
=
∫ ∞
0
λ2e
−λ2t0
[
e−t0 +
∫ t0
0
e−r1e−λ2(t0−r1)
[
e−(t0−r1) +
∫ t0−r1
0
e−r2e−λ2(t0−r1−r2)×
[
e−(t0−r1−r2) + . . .
]d−1
dr2
]d−1
dr1
]d0
dt0 (32)
=
∫ ∞
0
λ2e
−t0(λ2+d0)
[
1 + e−t0(λ2+d−2)
∫ t0
0
er1(λ2+d−2)
[
1 + e−(t0−r1)(λ2+d−2)
∫ t0−r1
0
er2(λ2+d−2)×
[1 + . . .]d−1 dr2
]d−1
dr1
]d0
dt0 (33)
Figure 11: Probability of detection of the first-timestamp estimator, where d is the node degree. d0 denotes the degree of the
source, which we eventually set to d0 = d− 1 for symmetry. We condition on the source’s reporting time τ0 = t0. Ri denotes
the delay of infection times between i’s parent and i.
v∗ = 0. Moreover, we let the source have a different de-
gree d0 than the rest of tree for simplicity of calculation.
We write the probability of detection explicitly in Figure
11. The expression starts by conditioning on the reporting
time of the true source, τ0, then conditions on the times at
which other nodes receive the message. Recall that node i
receives the message at time Xi, and reports the message to
the adversary at time τi.
Expression (33) can be written recursively. Define
g(a) , e−a(λ2+d−2)
∫ a
0
eu(λ2+d−2)[1 + g(a− u)]d−1du.
(34)
Letting s = a− u, we get
g(a) =
∫ a
0
e−s(λ2+d−2)[1 + g(s)]d−1ds.
Substituting g(a) into Equation (33) gives
P(τ0 < τm) =
∫ ∞
0
λ2e
−t0(λ2+d0)[1 + g(t0)]
d0dt0, (35)
where d0 is the degree of the source. To make this expression
symmetric with respect to the recursive function g(·), we
assume that the source has degree d−2, and all other nodes
have degree d, so d0 = d− 2. We subsequently compute the
probability of detection by solving for g(t0), which can be
written as a differential equation:
g′(a) = e−a(λ2+d−2)[1 + g(a)]d−1,
with initial condition g(0) = 0. This separable, nonlinear
differential equation can be solved exactly, giving
g(a) =
(
(d− 2)e−a(λ2+d−2) + λ2
λ2 + d− 2
)− 1
d−2
− 1.
Substituting into (35), we obtain the exact probability of
detection:
P(τ0 < τm) =
λ2(log(λ2 + d− 2)− log(λ2))
d− 2 .
Letting λ2 = θ, we get
P(τ0 < τm) =
θ
d− 2 log
(
d+ θ − 2
θ
)
, (36)
which is the final expression.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 4.2
To prove this claim, we analyze the (suboptimal) reporting
centrality estimator, which achieves condition (11). Our goal
is to show that under an eavesdropper adversary, reporting
centrality has a strictly positive probability of detection as
d→∞.
Let Rt = {v ∈ Vt|Rv(t) = 1} denote the set of reporting
centers at time t. We compute the probability of detection
by conditioning on the event v∗ ∈ Rt. For brevity of no-
tation, we use vˆ to denote the reporting centrality source
estimate in this proof. For any fixed time t, we have
P(MRC(τ , G) =v
∗) = P(v∗ ∈ Rt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
×
P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗|v∗ ∈ Rt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
. (37)
Note that the probability of detection is defined for a fixed
t. Our goal is to lower-bound this quantity as t → ∞. The
proof consists of three steps:
(a) Show that lim inft→∞ P(v∗ ∈ Rt) ≥ Cd > 0.
(b) Show that P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗|v∗ ∈ Rt) = 1.
(c) Combine parts (a) and (b) to give the claim.
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For readability, we abbreviate our notation in this proof.
The number of nodes in the subtree T v
∗
w will be denoted
Nw(t) instead of NTv∗w (t), and the number of reporting nodes
in this subtree will be denoted Yw(t) instead of YTv∗w (t).
Thus N1(t) denotes the number of infected nodes in the first
subtree of v∗, and Y1(t) denotes the number of reporting
nodes in the first subtree of v∗.
Part (a): Show that lim inft→∞ P(v∗ ∈ Rt) ≥ Cd.
We demonstrate this by conditioning on the event that v∗
is the unique rumor center in Gt. This happens if and
only if ∀w ∈ N (v∗), Nw(t) < N(t)/2 [37], where N (v∗)
denotes the neighbors of v∗. We let Ct = {v ∈ Vt | v =
rumor center of Gt}, which gives
P(v∗ ∈ Rt) ≥ P(v∗ ∈ Ct, |Ct|= 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a1)
P(v∗ ∈ Rt|v∗ ∈ Ct, |Ct|= 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a2)
Part (a1) is studied in Theorem 3.1 of [37], which shows that
lim inf
t→∞
P(v∗ ∈ Ct, |Ct|= 1)
= 1− d
(
1− I1/2
(
1
d−2 , 1 +
1
d−2
))
, (38)
where I1/2(a, b) is the regularized incomplete Beta function,
or the probability that a Beta random variable with param-
eters a and b takes a value in [0, 1/2).
For part (a2), we show that limt→∞ P(v∗ ∈ Rt|v∗ ∈ Ct, |Ct|=
1) = 1. Our approach is to first show that the fraction of
reporting nodes in each tree converges almost surely to a
constant as t → ∞. We subsequently show that if v∗ is a
unique rumor center, it is almost surely a reporting center
as t→∞.
Lemma B.1. For all i ∈ [d], the following condition holds
as t→∞:
Yi(t)
Ni(t)
a.s.−−→ αd,θ = θ
d+ θ − 2 . (39)
(Proof in Section B.5.1)
This lemma states that the ratio of reporting to infected
nodes in each subtree converges almost surely to a constant.
The proof proceeds by describing the evolution of each sub-
tree and the adversary’s observations as a generalized Po´lya
urn process with negative coefficients. The ratio of balls in
this urn process can be shown to converge almost surely,
which implies the claim. Now we use Lemma B.1 to show
that v∗ is a reporting center.
Since v∗ is a unique rumor center, ∀i ∈ [d] (where [d] =
{1, 2, . . . , d}), Ni(t) < N(t)/2 [36]. Because of this condi-
tioning and the fact that the infected subtree sizes (normal-
ized by the total number of infected nodes) converge almost
surely [37], for any outcome ω of the underlying diffusion
process, it holds that Ni(t, ω)/N(t, ω)
t→∞−−−→ (1/2 − δi(ω)),
for some δi(ω) > 0. Here Ni(t, ω) denotes the number of
infected nodes in subtree i at time t under outcome ω. We
wish to show that for any given, feasible set of offsets δi(ω),
i ∈ [d], v∗ eventually becomes a reporting center w.p. 1.
Since Yi(t)/Ni(t)
a.s.−−→ αd,θ, for a given outcome ω of the
underlying process, we can write Yi(t, ω) = Ni(t, ω)(αd,θ +
i(t, ω)), where i(t, ω) ∈ R. Note that i(t, ω) t→∞−−−→ 0. We
write the condition for being a reporting center as
Yi(t, ω)
?
<
Y (t, ω)
2
=⇒ Ni(t, ω)(αd,θ + i(t, ω))
?
<
αd,θN(t, ω)
2
+
∑
j∈[d] j(t, ω)Nj(t, ω)
2
=⇒ N(t, ω)(1
2
− δi(ω))(αd,θ + i(t, ω))
?
<
1
2
αd,θN(t, ω) + ∑
j∈[d]
j(t, ω)N(t, ω)(
1
2
− δj(ω))

=⇒ i(t, ω)−
∑
j j(t, ω)(
1
2
− δj(ω))
1− δi(ω)
2
?
< αd,θ · δi(ω).
(40)
Note that αd,θ and δi(ω) are both strictly positive, and
lim
t→∞
i(t, ω)−
∑
j j(t, ω)(
1
2
− δj(ω))
1− δi(ω)
2
= 0.
Therefore, for every outcome ω, there exists a time Tω such
that for all t > Tω, condition (40) is satisfied, so limt→∞ P(v∗ ∈
Rt|v∗ ∈ Ct, |Ct|= 1) = 1.
Putting together parts (a1) and (a2), we get
lim inf
t→∞
P(v∗ ∈ Rt)
≥ 1− d
(
1− I1/2
(
1
d− 2 , 1 +
1
d− 2
))
.
Part (b): Show that P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗|v∗ ∈ Rt) = 1.
We show this by demonstrating that if v∗ is a reporting
center, no other reporting centers exist.
We show that there can be at most one reporting center
by contradiction. Suppose there are two nodes, v∗ and w,
both of which are reporting centers. Consider the d subtrees
adjacent to v∗. Suppose the neighbors of v∗ are labelled
w1, . . . , wd. Each of these neighbors is the root of an infected
subtree T v
∗
wi . Since v
∗ is a reporting center, we have two
properties:
Ywi(t) <
Y (t)
2
∀i ∈ [d] (41)
Yv∗(t) +
∑
i∈[d]
Ywi(t) = Y (t). (42)
Now suppose another node u 6= v∗ is also a reporting
center. We label the neighbors of u as z1, . . . , zd. We will
use This implies that
YTuzi
(t) <
Y (t)
2
∀i ∈ [d] (43)
Yu(t) +
∑
i∈[d]
YTuzi
(t) = Y (t). (44)
Suppose without loss of generality that z1, w1 ∈ P (u, v∗).
In order to satisfy condition (43), it must hold that Yv∗(t)+∑d
i=2 Ywi(t) <
Y (t)
2
. Substituting this condition into (42),
and using condition (41) implies that Yw1(t) >
Y (t)
2
. This is
a contradiction because v∗ is assumed to be an element of
Rt, which implies that Yw1(t) < Y (t)/2. Therefore, there
can be no more than one reporting center, so P(MRC(τ , G) =
v∗|v∗ ∈ Rt) = 1.
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Part (c): Combine parts (a) and (b) to give the final claim.
We wish to lower bound lim inft→∞ P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗). Re-
call from (37) that
P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗) ≥ P(v∗ ∈ Rt)P(MRC(τ , G) = v∗|v∗ ∈ Rt).
We have bounds for each term:
lim inf
t→∞
P(v∗ ∈ Rt)
≥ 1− d
(
1− I1/2
(
1
d− 2 , 1 +
1
d− 2
))
P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗|v∗ ∈ Rt) = 1,
which gives
lim inf
t→∞
P(vˆ = v∗) ≥ 1− d
(
1− I1/2
(
1
d− 2 , 1 +
1
d− 2
))
,
thereby proving the claim.
B.5.1 Proof of Lemma B.1
The evolution of the (partially unobserved) infected sub-
graph on regular trees can be described by a Po´lya urn pro-
cess with d colors of balls. Each ball represents one active
edge between an infected and an uninfected node, and all
active edges in the same source-adjacent subtree have the
same color. At t = 0, we have one ball of each color, since
there are d active edges extending from the true source.
Because of the memorylessness of spreading, each of the
active edges in Gt is equally likely to spread the infection
next. The urn evolves as follows: pick a ball uniformly
at random; the subtree corresponding to the drawn color
spreads the message over one of its active edges, infecting a
neighbor w. Once w is infected, one active edge is removed
from the subtree (i.e., the edge that just spread the mes-
sage), and d − 1 new active edges are added (from w to its
uninfected neighbors). In our urn, this corresponds to re-
placing the drawn ball and adding d − 2 balls of the same
color. The replacement matrix for this urn can therefore be
written as A = (d−2)Id, where Id denotes the d×d identity
matrix.
This Po´lya urn is well-studied, and in the limit, the frac-
tion of balls of each color is known to converge to a Dirich-
let distribution [22]. In order to model the eavesdropper’s
observations, we generalize the urn model by additionally
giving each ball a pattern: striped or solid. Each solid ball
corresponds to an active edge in the underlying diffusion
process, whereas each striped ball represents an active edge
from an infected node to the adversary. When such an edge
fires, the adversary observes the timestamp of the sending
node.
We adapt the previous urn dynamics in two key ways.
First, when a solid ball is drawn, we still add d−2 solid balls
of the same color, but now we also add θ striped balls of the
same color. These represent the θ independent connections
between the node and the adversary. Second, when a striped
ball is draw, we remove θ striped balls of the same color from
the urn (i.e., the adversary only uses the first timestamp it
receives). Thus, the replacement matrix for a single subtree
looks like
A =
( solid stripe
solid d− 2 0
stripe θ −θ
)
. (45)
Let sn and rn denote the number of solid and striped
balls, respectively, at the nth draw of the urn. The following
condition holds as n→∞:
rn
sn
a.s.−−→ θ
d+ θ − 2 . (46)
To show this, we use the following result from [17], simplified
for clarity:
Theorem 3.21 from [17]. Consider a Po´lya urn with re-
placement matrix A. Assume the following conditions:
1. For i, j ∈ [d], Aii ≥ −1, and Aij ≥ 0 for i 6= j.
2. Aij <∞ for all i, j ∈ [d].
3. The largest real eigenvalue λA of A is positive, λA > 0.
4. The largest real eigenvalue λA of A is simple.
5. The urn starts with at least one ball of a dominating
type. A dominating type is a type of ball that, when
drawn, produces balls of every other type.
6. λA belongs to the dominating type.
7. The urn does not go extinct.
Then n−1[sn rn]ᵀ
a.s.−−→ λAv, where ᵀ denotes the trans-
pose of a vector, λA is the largest eigenvalue of replacement
matrix A, and v is the corresponding right eigenvector.
Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied by examination of A. The
eigenvalues of A are (d−2) and −θ, so conditions 3 and 4 are
satisfied. Conditions 5 and 6 are met because λA belongs
to the class of solid balls (i.e., a dominating type), and the
urn starts with a solid ball by construction. Condition 7 is
met because solid balls are never removed, and we start with
one solid ball. Thus, Theorem 3.21 from [16] applies, which
implies that rn
sn
a.s.−−→ v2
v1
= θ
d+θ−2 , since the eigenvector for
λA = (d− 2) is v = [d+ θ − 2, θ].
There is a one-to-one mapping between the evolution of
such an urn and the spreading of the message. Without
loss of generality, we consider the evolution of the first sub-
tree, N1(t). Let βn denote the time at which the nth ball is
drawn. We define s(t) = max{n:βn≤t,βn+1>t} sn and r(t) =
max{n:βn≤t,βn+1>t} rn. We can now map the number of re-
porting and infected nodes to the evolution of the Po´lya urn:
s(t) = 1 + (d− 2)N1(t)
r(t) = N1(t)− Y1(t).
Solving for Y1(t) and N1(t) and taking the limit gives
limt→∞
Y1(t)
N1(t)
= 1 − d−2
θ
limt→∞
r(t)
s(t)−1 =
θ
d+θ−2 with prob-
ability 1, since both s(t) and r(t) tend to infinity as t→∞.
B.6 Proof of Corollary 5.1
The outline of this proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.2.
One difference is that in the spy-based adversary, the true
source v∗ never reports to the adversary, so Yv∗(t) = 0. This
does not change the proof in any significant way. We again
condition on the event that the true source v∗ is a reporting
center, which gives.
P(MRC(τ , G) =v
∗) = P(v∗ ∈ Rt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
×
P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗|v∗ ∈ Rt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
. (47)
Recall that Rt is the set of reporting centers at time t. For
part (b), if v∗ is a reporting center, then it is a unique report-
ing center (from Proof B.5), so the probability of detection
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is 1. Thus, the key is to characterize (a), P(v∗ ∈ Rt), as
t→∞.
As before, we lower bound this quantity by conditioning
on the event that v∗ is the unique rumor center in Gt. We
let Ct = {v ∈ Vt | v = rumor center of Gt}, which gives
P(v∗ ∈ Rt) ≥ P(v∗ ∈ Ct, |Ct|= 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a1)
P(v∗ ∈ Rt|v∗ ∈ Ct, |Ct|= 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a2)
We know from Proof B.5 that part (a1) gives
lim inf
t→∞
P(v∗ ∈ Ct, |Ct|= 1)
= 1− d
(
1− I1/2
(
1
d−2 , 1 +
1
d−2
))
, (48)
where I1/2(a, b) is the regularized incomplete Beta function,
or the probability that a Beta random variable with param-
eters a and b takes a value in [0, 1/2).
For part (a2), we show that limt→∞ P(v∗ ∈ Rt|v∗ ∈ Ct, |Ct|=
1) = 1. This portion is the only real difference in proof be-
tween the present corollary and Theorem 4.2. Again, we
show that the fraction of reporting nodes (or spies) in each
tree converges almost surely to a constant as t→∞. How-
ever, unlike the eavesdropper adversary, the spy-based ad-
versary does not require Po`lya urns to make this case.
Claim B.2. For all i ∈ [d], the following condition holds
as t→∞:
Yi(t)
Ni(t)
a.s.−−→ p. (49)
This claim follows easily from the central limit theorem,
since the number of spy nodes (or reporting nodes) in the
ith subtree is simply a Binomial(Ni(t), p) random variable.
Recall thatNi(t) denotes the number of infected nodes in the
ith subtree adjacent to v∗. Therefore, by the same argument
as Proof B.5, if v∗ is a unique rumor center, it is almost
surely also a reporting center as t→∞.
This, in turn, implies the overall result:
lim inf
t→∞
P(MRC(τ , G) = v
∗) ≥ Cd > 0.
where
Cd = 1− d
(
1− I1/2
(
1
d− 2 , 1 +
1
d− 2
))
.
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